HABITAT Norway

World Habitat Day – October 7th, 2002

Conference in Oslo on

«The SegretatedCity»

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

Welcome and Opening address: «Norway and the Habitat Agenda»

Roger Iversen (Political advisor, The Norwegian Ministry for Local Government and Regional Development)

Chairman, dear participants from abroad, Ladies and Gentlemen.

Let me first of all convey greetings and regrets from the minister Mrs Erna Solberg that she was not able to participate in this annual event. She has asked me to present her message to you, which is an honour and pleasure for me to do.

Housing and Human Settlements has usually been regarded as a fairly domestic issue - each country has traditionally defined its own priorities and policies. We have experienced quite different approaches and policy designs. Institutional structures and implementation of policies vary a lot and in the end the housing situations differ even between neighbouring countries. Also between countries like Norway and Sweden.

However, international co-operation in the field of housing and human settlements has been increasing, especially regarding exchange of experience and research. International conferences on priority issues are frequently being arranged. One reason for this is - firstly - a growing awareness of the fact that housing is an integral part of basic human needs and as such reflected in declarations on Human Rights, and – secondly – that globally, the housing situation is growing worse. The number of homeless people and people living under unacceptable living conditions now exceeds 1 billion. The vast majority of those are living in the so-called developing world. But housing policy remains a challenge also in the rich part of the world. In most countries – both in the South and in the North – the most severe challenges are connected to a rapid urbanisation process and to the big cities.

Recently Norway hosted two international conferences here in Oslo; one under the title of «Sustainable Building» and one on migration termed Metropolis. As government responsible for both themes, the minister had the honour to participate in the opening of both conferences. The Minister emphasised the importance of international co-operation, and said that:

> « We do not have to make the same mistakes in every country, but must learn from each other. We need to meet, and exchange ideas, and the Internet opens up for new and more sustainable ways of communication. We need to work together on research programmes and have easy access to the good results and practises.»

With the United Nations Habitat Conference in Istanbul in 1996 a new and ambitious agenda was agreed, named the Habitat agenda. Norway played an active part in the formulation of crucial paragraphs, like the right to housing - in particular women's rights and generally the issue of secure tenure.

In 2001 a follow-up of the Istanbul conference was arranged in New York as a special session of the UN General Assembly. The session was called Istanbul + 5 and was aiming to survey the development in the field of human settlements throughout the World. On the basis of the UN millennium declaration a special Habitat declaration was agreed which emphasises that an effective implementation of the Habitat Agenda is urgently needed to turn the negative trends in human settlements development world-wide. It must be fair to say that the Norwegian delegation played an important role in negotiating this declaration and to get it unanimously agreed.

The strong trends towards further urbanisation of human settlements in the world has been a main issue for UN Habitat, and especially, the living conditions in the bigger cities in developing countries. The Millennium declaration formulated a very concrete goal – namely to significantly improve the living conditions of 100 million slum dwellers by the year 2020. This has to be followed up by UN-Habitat. A conference on these and related issues was arranged in Nairobi in May this year, named World Urban Forum. This was a conference working on concrete actions, programmes to be taken in order to improve the living conditions for the urban poor, for example within the field of healthy water and sanitation conditions.

The World Urban Forum was also a pre-conference event to the World Summit on Sustainable Development recently held in Johannesburg, South Africa. In Johannesburg, a significant number of «Partnership Initiatives» were launched under the umbrella of «Sustainable Urbanisation», underlining that there will be no sustainable development without sustainable urbanisation and a sustainable human settlements development. This was also reflected in the Action Plan adopted by the Summit as well as in the political declaration, which more than 100 heads of states agreed upon in Johannesburg. During the negotiations, an «S» was added to the WEHAB-initiative of the Secretary General of the UN, Mr Kofi Annan, an «S» for «Adequate Shelter» . This means that the top priorities of the international community in the coming years in the struggle for a sustainable development includes the areas of Water and Sanitation, Energy, Health, Agriculture, Biodiversity – and Shelter.

The outcome of World Summit on Sustainable Development, and the importance of the Summit, are debated. It is no secret that the Norwegian delegation, headed by the Prime Mininster Kjell Magne Bondevik, and with the Ministers for Environment and for International assistance, Mr Børge Brende and Mrs Hilde Frafjord Johnsen as active participants at the conference, would have wished the Summit Output to be stronger, for instance on renewable energy. But the results from a human settlements point of view are to a large extent satisfactory. The World Summit will provide UN Habitat with a fairly strong mandate to enforce its work on the implementation of the Habitat Agenda.

As most of you are aware, Norway has been a strong supporter of UN Habitat for many years and especially since the Habitat II conference we have played a key role in the revitalisation of Habitat . The revitalisation process culminated last autumn when the General Assembly decided to make Habitat a fully-fledged UN Programme. This summer, the Minister for International Assistance, Hilde Frafjord Johnsen, took the initiative within the so-called Utstein Group to also strenghten UN Habitat financially so that it will be able to play an even more vital role as the focal point in the UN system for human settlement issues. The Utstein Group consists of UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway. Together, these countries will form a joint partnership programme with UN Habitat aiming at filling the financial gap of approximately 10 million USD which is necessary to bring Habitat into full force.

Maybe the most important part of the Sustainable Urbanisation Partnership Initiative package from Johannesburg is the Cities Alliance Programme. The Cities Alliance was set up in 1999 as a joint programme between UN Habitat, the World Bank, eleven of the most important donor countries and a number of cities in developing countries. The programme focuses especially on the improvement for the urban poor and a lot of



different projects in cities in developing countries has been initiated and financially supported. Norway has entered the programme as donor and have so far contributed 500 000 USD or approximately 4 mill NOK. We are thus entitled to participate in the governing board of the programme and thus influencing the policy of the programme. Tomorrow a Governing Council meeting for the Cities Alliance programme is taking place in Brussels and Norway will be present with a professional delegation with members both from The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, NORAD and our Ministry. I trust they will be active on behalf of our government, we have an excellent co-operation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

At the Brussels meeting, the Cities Alliance is expected to adopt an African Facility which will enable Sub Saharian African cities to join the Cities Alliance to a far larger extent than this part of the world has been able to so far. Sub Saharian Cities experience today the most rapid urbanisation ever seen by mankind. At the same time they are the cities least capable of handling the enormous challenges connected to the unprecedented growth. Therefore, Norway has taken the initiative to seed the African Facility with a NOK 5 million commitment for the first year, expecting other donor countries to follow. The Facility should mainly be used to strengthen the local capacity building in the cities, both among public servants and private actors, to handle local processes necessary to make sustainable City Development Plans and to effectively target the goal of «Cities without Slums».

The topic of the celebration of the Habitat day here in Oslo relates well to important issues in the Habitat Agenda and Norwegian priorities, not least regarding the improvement of living conditions for the poor. Looking into the world cities we see clear structures of segregation where large groups of poor people are concentrated in specific areas which are overcrowded, with very bad housing and environmental conditions. As a country with strong international commitments we must participate actively in fighting this situation. At the same time we should be aware that tendencies to segregation are appearing even in our cities. We are now looking into this in relation to the report on the bigger city policies to our parliament - Stortinget. Thus I hope that this seminar can provide useful knowledge which can be utilised both in our international work as well as here in Norway.

I wish you a very good and inspiring seminar, and I thank you for your attention

Introduction to the conference programme

May Sommerfelt (The Norwegian Habitat Association)

On behalf of Habitat Norway, it is a great pleasure for me to welcome all of you, to this conference on the International Habitat Day. We especially welcome our guests from Africa, from India and from England. It is encouraging for Habitat Norway to note that there are around 80 participants in this event and that we this year have a good mixture of people involved in international housing and shelter affairs as well as national housing affairs.

As you may all know, in December 1985, the General Assembly of the United Nations, designated the first Monday in October as «World Habitat Day.» According to UN-Habitat the purpose of the Habitat Day is to reflect on the living conditions of human beings, and to address the shortcomings of those conditions. The theme of this year's celebration – as set out by UN-Habitat is «City to City Cooperation».

This is the third year Habitat Norway in co-operation with the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development mark the International Habitat Day with a gathering like this.

Habitat Norway is an NGO, initiated in the International Year of Shelter for the Homeless in 1987. The organisation's main aim is to promote the shelter issues, particularly in the south, and to stimulate and initiate co-operations and support in this field. Habitat Norway is now being affiliated with the Norwegian Housing and Town Planning Association.

Norwegian Federation of Housing and Planning also keeps a focus on the national housing scene, although this is not its main concern.

But for the celebration of the Habitat day, we want to bring together and embrace both the national and the international Habitat communities and to show that we are a big interest group - big makes strong - and that we together can make an impact. We also want to show that in spite of major differences between north and south there are common denominators.

And the common denominator being addressed today is the title of the conference: the SEGREGATED CITY. The segregated city includes spatial socio-economic segregation, segregation by ethnic groups, by colour and by religion.

We find socio-economic segregation in the established and historical cities in the north, like in Oslo. The river Akerselva has since the seventeenth century made the demarcation between the more affluent citizens living in the western parts and the less affluent, or traditionally the working class, living in the eastern part of the city.

In cities in the south, which are growing with an accelerating pace, the urban poor are often located in the most disadvantaged areas, along flooding river banks, on areas highly polluted by near-by industries, rubbish heaps and so on. While the more affluent people reside in the environmental more favourable parts of the cities and often with security guards and what have become known as gated communities.

In addition, there are evidences that the segregated cities in the north are taking a lead in becoming even more segregated. It is a well know problem that key workers such as teachers, nurses and public service managers are being priced out of some of Britain's cities, like in London.

Social and spatial segregation follows globalisation. Cities are part of a global market. Global Report on Human Settlement from UN-Habitat 2001 in their «key issues and messages» gives a highly relevant description of the link between human settlements, urbanisation and globalisation which occur in cities in the north as well as cities in the south:

> «Globalisation increases competition between, as well as fragmentation within, cities, with contradictory effects. Urban government has shifted from a managerial approach to entrepreneurialism that treats the city as a product to be marketed. This marketing approach, and the emphasis on restructuring the

> city so that it appeals to global business, has led to the dominance of economic interests in urban planning.»

Global Report on Human Settlement 2001 from UN-Habitat comes up with the following recommendation to the challenge:



> «The challenge is to develop *enabling strategies* that are not narrowly restricted to the economic functioning of markets, but that also include support for the exercise of citizenship – of 'the rights to the city', including the realisation of *housing rights.*»

On this Habitat-day we want to explore the situation, as it is experienced in cities in the south as well as in the north. We want to create insight and understanding - and from here on hopefully both NGO's, Universities, Research Institutions, NORAD, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Local Affairs will seek for ways of getting involved in one of the main causes of the segregated city: to do with poverty and urbanisation

On behalf of Habitat Norway, I hope and believe this will be a fruitful day

Thank you.

Urban Growth and Urban Crises

Mariken Vaa (the Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden)

This presentation reviews briefly the magnitude and patterns of urban growth in the developing world, and the multiple crises that most cities experience. The main focus is on the crisis of shelter provision and inadequate shelter policies. Governments' responses to unauthorized settlements and internationally formulated strategies to alleviate the housing shortage are presented. In the final section, it is argued that foreign aid can only play a limited role in urban development, and that better governance and an active citizenry is needed to make cities better places to live.

I. Magnitude and patterns of urban growth

The speed with which the developing world is urbanising is unprecedented in human history. During the industrial revolution in Europe and North America, which in demographic terms is the most rapidly urbanising period in history up to the mid twentieth century, cities grew rarely by more than one or perhaps two per cent per year, and that only in specific boom years. In Africa and Asia in the 1960s and 70s, cities often grew by seven to eight percent per year, and a yearly growth rate of four per cent is still not unusual in these two regions. In Latin America, city growth rates have slowed down considerably, as most countries there are now overwhelmingly urban. Among the most rapidly urbanising regions of the world is today mainland China.

Almost half of the world's population is now living in cities. In a few years, more people will be living in cities than rural areas. The world' total urban population is estimated to double from 2.5 billion in 1995 to 5 billion in 2025. Overall, the urban population is growing between two and three times faster than the rural population, and virtually all population growth is taking place in developing countries (UNCHS 1996:xxi).

From in-migration to natural growth

The main components of urban growth are in-migration from rural areas and high rates of natural increase, i. e more births than deaths among the population already settled in the city. In some instances, rapid growth of cities is recorded because rural areas have been reclassified as urban. The relative importance of natural growth and in-migration varies. Generally, the higher annual growth rate of a city, the more important is in-migration. The role of in-migration is now decreasing, and is estimated to account for 40-60 per cent of urban growth. Since immigrants to cities have for decades been young, i.e. mainly people of childbearing age, high growth will continue even if in-migration were to dry up completely. Urban growth has slowed down in most parts of the developing world (excluding China) and mega-cities (cities of more than 10 millions) have not become as dominant as predicted. In 1990, they housed about 3 percent of the world's population, and censuses show that several of them had had slower growth rates than predicted.

The links between urban growth and economic, social and political development are not straightforward. Rapid growth is often given as the reason for urban problems, such as lack of employment, housing and service, and increased inequalities and poverty. However, some of the largest and fastest growing cities in the developing world have managed quite well in providing housing and services, while some of the worst housing conditions are found in declining industrial centres and stagnant smaller towns (UNCHS 1996:xxii).

II. Urban crises

However, most governments in the developing world have been coping poorly with the growth of their cities. With a few exceptions, these cities have enormous environmental problems and huge deficits in the provision of housing and related services, in drainage and roads, schools, and health centres etc. There are multiple crises, of employment, poverty, shelter, environment, service provision and governance. Structural Adjustment Programmes have hit urban populations particularly hard. Public retrenchment programmes have led to unemployment, devaluations and cut-down on subsidies have let to rapidly dropping real incomes. Changing labour markets has led to reduced job security and loss of incomes. Reduced spending power in the middle strata has led to less demand for the products and services of the workers in the informal economy. The number of urban dwellers living in absolute poverty has increased steadily since the 1980s.

One of the most unrecognized crises is perhaps the environmental one. Air pollution and noise from transport and industries, and from households use of firewood and carbon make the cities very unhealthy places. Untreated toxic waste from industries exacerbates the situation. Unclean water, solid waste and lack of sanitation and drainage make homes and neighbour-hoods represent daily health hazards, particula-rly for women and children, the primary users of local space.



III. The shelter crisis

For the reminder of this presentation, I will focus on the crisis in the provision of housing. Housing is an obvious basic need, and in an urban setting, adequate shelter is closely linked to services, notably water supply, waste removal , drainage and sanitation.

Unmet demand for housing results in the emergence of the illegal city

Most developing countries are former colonies, and have inherited a legal framework for urban development which was geared at controlling settlement rather than cope with rapid growth. Zoning laws, building standards and other planning regulations do not favour the provision of housing affordable to the poor, or even to the not-so-poor. The result is the emergence of unauthorized, or illegal settlements, consisting of dwellings constructed without permission on un-serviced land. The proportion of urban populations residing in such settlements range from 30 to well over 70 per cent in some cities. The gap between the number of housing units produced legally and the growth of urban populations is considerable. Hardoy and Satterthwaite have estimated that in recent years, between 70 and 95 per cent of all new housing units in the cities of the developing world has been built illegally, or if you prefer, extra-legally (Hardoy et al. 1990:230). New unauthorized settlements are appearing and the older ones continue to grow (Fernandes and Varley. 1998)

Shelter standards and incomes in such settlements may vary considerably. However, one major difference between living conditions there and in the rest of the city, lies in the lack of social and physical infrastruc-ture, which is directly linked to the settlements' legal status. Unless some legalization process or upgrading project is envisaged, city authorities feel no obligation to provide water, sanitation and drainage, pave roads, collect garbage, build schools and clinics etc.

Governments' responses

There are enormous variations in legal contexts both between countries, and in what de facto recognition or acceptance unauthorized settlements within the same city may enjoy. In some countries, particularly in Latin America, semi-recognition of invasions and other extra-legal ways of forming settlements became a more frequent response than in other parts of the world. In Africa and many parts of Asia, the government response was in most cases to treat the unauthorized settlements as an unacceptable, but passing phenomenon, often bulldozing whole settlements when land was needed for other purposes, or their presence was for other reasons deemed undesirable. Gradually, however, the official, negative view of «slums and squatter settlements» began to be questioned. The inefficiency of demolition and relocation in meeting the housing shortage became obvious, as official housing statistics documented mounting shelter deficits.

Surveys and case studies from all parts of the developing world documented that squatters were people much like others, who were well integrated in the urban economy and who had by their own effort developed settlements fitting their incomes and housing prefer-ences. Gradually, alternative housing strategies were formulated by donors and international credit institutions. These alternatives originated to a large extent in empirical work by social scientists, architects and other pro-fessionals, who had studied how urban residents actually cope.

Internationally formulated strategies

Habitat I, the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements held in Vancouver 1976, indicated that governments' attitudes towards slum and squatter settlements were changing. The overwhel-ming majority of govern-ments participating in the conference officially recognized the necessity of taking appropriate measures to improve uncontrolled settlements and to integrate their inhabitants into the national develop-ment process. (United Nations 1976, reported in UNCHS/Habitat 1982:5). In the following decade, the United Nations agency principally concerned with the urban sector, the United Nations Centre for Human Settle-ments (UNCHS/Habitat), took these ideas out of the specific context of improving unauthorized settlements. In its Global Strategy for shelter to the year 2000 from 1988, later adopted by the UN General Assembly, Habitat formulated a new role for govern-ments in housing development and service provision in cities. Their task was not to construct shelter and provide services but to be facilitators or «enablers». The Strategy recommended that governments concentrate on creating incentives for householders, NGOs and the private sector to provide shelter and services. It was based on the notion that housing should not be seen as simply a social expense, but that it contributes significantly to economic and social develop-ment. In subsequent publications, «enabling» has been developed further, implying the provision of legislative, institutional and financial frameworks whereby initiative and entrepreneurship in markets, communities and in households can effectively develop the urban housing sector (Pugh 1994: 358).

The second United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II) held in Istanbul in 1996, had two principal themes: «Adequate Shelter for All» and «Sustainable human settlement development in an urbanizing world». Again, «enabling» was a pivotal concept. The participating governments committed themselves «to the strategy of enabling all key actors in the public, private and community sectors to play an effective role - at national, state/provincial metropolitan and local levels - in human settlement and shelter development» (UNCHS 1997:27). In a number of other paragraphs, which can be read to bear directly on improvement of extra-legal shelter, the Habitat Agenda advocates inter alia transparency, decentralization, strong local govern-ment, citizen participation and empower-ment, access to credit, regulariza-tion of self-built housing, and revision of institutional and legal frame-works which impede implementation of the lofty goals of the conference.

The Habitat II Agenda reflects in part the anti-statist and neo-liberal political economy that became fashionable during the 1980s. But it also reflects the alternative housing strategy that has become orthodoxy in international thinking since Habitat I, where self-help housing is seen as the solution to the housing shortage rather than a problem that has to be eradicated. The role of governments is not to build houses, but to provide inexpensive land, basic services and security of tenure.

To what extent these policies will change the access of the urban poor to adequate shelter and improved shelter security remains to be seen. A number of governments had already at Habitat I in Vancouver endorsed the recommended policies of assisted self-help and upgrading, but pursued their established policies of clearing settlements that they deem substandard and building subsidised apart-ments for the not-so-poor.



In a study from 1997, done for Habitat, Jan Hesselberg (1997:71) observes that in developing countries generally, public sector efforts for providing shelter to the urban poor have had little impact. Programmes have been both been limited and expensive and have required large subsidies. Squatter improvement projects have not recovered their costs nor have the improved shelter always been affordable to the poor. In a detailed study of urban shelter delivery to the poorest groups in India, Indonesian and Mexico, he notes that although all three countries have endorsed the Global Strategy for Shelter to the Year 2000, implementation have been less than consistent. Legal restrictions and building regulations have not been overhauled. The access of the poor to affordable building materials has not been significantly improved. What has happened, however, is a downward pressure on cheaper housing, since the reduced public construction of housing for the not-so-poor has not been accompanied by an increase in private sector building (1997:9). This is a record that probably holds for a large number of developing countries.

IV. The limits of aid

In the 1970s and 80s, legalization and service provision in squatter settlements was the typical form of donor-assisted urban development (Skinner et al 1987, Vaa 1995). Until recently, actual upgrading interventions, as opposed to policies for urban development, were almost invariably conceived as discrete projects. They might sometimes be called programmes, which usually meant that several projects were lumped together in one shared administration, or were financed under one single loan. By project is usually meant an undertaking outside the day-to-day running of national, public agencies, with a defined set of objectives, a specified time-frame, a separate budget and staff recruited for the purpose. Donor-financed projects are usually organized in discrete phases, the so-called project cycle, which entails reconnaissance, identification, preparation and implementation. The degree to which recipient countries' agencies and personnel participate actively in all these phases varies; in the early days of development aid, their input was usually very limited. Particularly in the identification and preparation phases, outside consultants brought in by the donor agency may play a decisive part.

The lack of co-ordination among various parts of central and local bureaucracies in recipient countries is matched by a similar lack of co-ordination among donors. In recent years, some donors have formed «aid consortiums», where support to specific sectors in a given country is discussed and settled jointly with representatives from the recipient country. But these are exceptions rather than the rule. If donors are not any longer competing for «good projects» in order to be able to spend their money quickly, as they could be observed doing in the earlier decades of the aid era, they are still working in remark-able insulation from each other, both in preparing and implementing the projects they support. There is a wide gap between policies and recom-mendations hammered out by agencies and governments at international meetings and the actual behaviour by donor agencies in the field.

When urban improvement is undertaken as discreet projects, they risk remaining isolated events without much impact on the city as a whole. Unless the projects are well integrated in local government structures, and these agencies, together with the inhabitants of the upgraded settlement, feel they have a stake in the success of the project, sustained delivery of improved services is not likely (Cohen 2001).

It was mentioned earlier how co-ordination between national and local government structures is essential for project success. But perhaps one of the chief characteristics of underdevelopment is that such co-ordination is extremely difficult to achieve. Underdevelopment means incoherence - policies are adopted without the institutional mechanisms for implementing them being there. One typical instance is reported from Lima, Peru, where it was decided at the highest political level to let a new settlement be run by its community organizations, while supporting legislation giving these organizations authority was not passed (Rodell and Skinner 1983 p 17). In other cases, schools or clinics have been built by communal efforts, but the promised staff is not appointed, or only after long delay. Examples of this sort abound. The more comprehensive and complex the upgrading is, the more likely it is that incoherences will occur during implementation, undermin-ing the support of the residents which the project needs. Co-operation breaks down when promised services are not provided.

Donors and lenders have reassessed their urban policies. Well before Habitat II, the international development community stressed how institutio-nal reforms, flexibility in standards and remodelled planning procedures were needed if the urban poor were to get access to improved shelter and a safe environment (Rodwin 1987, Rondinelli and Cheema 1988 and Harris 1992).

The Global Report on Human Settlements 2001, produced by the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS) as part of the preparation for Habitat + 5 summit in New York, is an urgent call to action (UNCHS 2001). It argues that traditional goals of urban planning and development, aimed at supporting cities as engines of economic growth, are too narrow. In the face of globalisation, rising poverty and inequality require a new vision and new approaches to more adequately support the role of cities as agents of social change. Policies must focus on capacity building, especially at the local level and in civil society, and at fostering good governance.

A consistent theme throughout the Report is how to overcome the limits of the market mechanisms that have characterized globalisation processes, dominated by trans-national corporations seeking to maximize profit. It emphasizes the importance of «globalisation-from-below» with goals of social justice and environmental sustainability. Access to goods and services required for meeting daily needs, the Report argues, should be less dependent on people's ability-to-pay and based more on basic human rights recognized in international agreements, as seen in, for example, UNCHS' Global Campaign for Secure Tenure, which has been formulated after Habitat II in Istanbul.

The Report analyses the effects of growing poverty and deepening inequality on access to housing, safe water, adequate sanitation, transportation and other basic services. In spite of encouraging progress in some places, in many countries, real income is down, while the cost of living is increasing. The number of people living in poverty is also increasing. The uneven distribution of the benefits and costs of globalisation is magnified in cities. Cities are also the strategic sites where different interests contest the direction and goals of economic globalisation. The UNCHS Report acknowledges that lack of resources, insufficient institutional capacity, and persistent corruption often greatly limits the problem-solving abilities of governments. It stresses the need to tackle the pressing problems of urban livelihood and liveability through collaborative, broad-based partnerships of the public sector, the private sector, and non-governmental and community-based groups. It argues that policies to aid the poor help develop unrealised human capital, with benefits for the whole of society. The Report reminds us that rights-based approaches have been widely embraced by governments, and that now is the time to translate the rhetoric into action.



Given the immensity of the need for institutional reforms and investment, widespread ambivalence about urbanization both among donors and national governments and the drying up of development aid, it is unlikely that foreign technical and financial assistance will play any major role in the future development of world cities. The task rests squarely with city dwellers and their governments and leaders, who are facing the challenge of making their cities good places to live, not only for a tiny minority, but for the majority of their inhabitants.

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Urbanisation, Poverty and Segregation

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Introduction

In this presentation I shall deal with three distinct themes: urbanisation, poverty and segregation. All of them deserve presentations of their own. First, I will refer briefly to urbanisation processes, with special reference to Africa. Second, I will deal with poverty, especially the particular urban variant. Third, I will treat urban segregation as a pervasive and persistent social phenomenon in urban areas. However, I will attempt not to treat them in a compartmentalised fashion but rather highlight their interlinkages.

Urbanisation and Rural-Urban Linkages

The speaker before me has given a broad overview of the rapid urbanisation process unfolding in the developing world, especially where the pace of urban growth is highest at present. I shall not bore you with a repetition. Instead, I would like to dwell on an important aspect of the urbanisation process that is all too often overlooked or neglected: the urban-rural linkages that persist in the context of urbanisation.

I would like to take my point of departure at the micro level of the household. The concepts of 'household', 'family' and 'domestic group' have been the subject of considerable controversy in the social sciences over the years (Arizpe 1982; Netting et al. 1984; Smith et al. 1984; Martin and Beittel 1987; Folbre 1988; Guyer 1988; Russell 1993). Two issues have been at the forefront of discussion: (a) the conceptualisation and nature of the household universally, but especially in Third World, and (b) the use of the household as a unit of analysis.

At the most fundamental level a household consists of a number of individuals who 'eat from the same cooking pot' and thus reside in the same place (Appleton 1996:1812). It may comprise the nuclear family, i.e. a husband and a wife and their offspring, and, most commonly, a third generation of grandparents – in some cases also other relatives (uncles, aunts, unmarried or widowed sisters-in-law, or cousins) or non-relatives, e.g. foster children. This is generally referred to as the extended family, but co-resident units are not necessarily based on blood ties.



The co-residence implied by the 'cooking pot' definition may hold in the majority of cases, but in the context of migration and urbanisation a less stringent and more flexible definition is warranted in terms of residence pattern. Against a background of pervasive labour migration, emphasis should be placed, above all, on the social functions of the household rather than the co-residence of its members (Murray 1981).

Such a flexible household definition fits the African context, because it takes cognisance of the reality of the geographical dispersal of household members over considerable periods of time. As de facto household members migrants may at best be termed intermittent co-residents (Wilk and Netting 1984:19). Margo Russell (1993:779) shares this flexible approach, perhaps stretching it further:

> «Household must be conceptualised as an arbitrary grouping of people who come together to share, minimally, accommodation including cooking facilities. What else they share – income, beds, bodies, secrets, bank accounts, meals, lineage, wealth, kinship, recreation, rental, descendants – and for how long, will vary from culture to culture, from class to class, from place to place, from time to time».

Household cohesion is maintained by the reciprocal obligations of conjugal and agnatic ties rather than co-residence. In this sense the African household may – to some degree, at least where labour oscillation is prevalent – be reconceptualised as translocational, or perhaps as duo-local if the migratory pattern is oscillatory; Marc H. Ross and Thomas S. Weisner (1977:366) use the term 'network household' to underscore its fluidity.

- This definition captures both the phenomenon of temporarily split households and that of female-headed households (Clark 1984). The lax use of the latter concept may, however, at times cause confusion because it appears to subsume at least three different phenomena: Households in which the woman – for whatever reason – is the de facto main income earner, the principal decision-maker and the key manager;
- A de jure sub-category of the above, i.e. households headed by a woman without a primary adult male (spouse), due to widowhood, divorce or singlehood by choice; and
- Households of which the woman is the principal manager by virtue of her husband's temporary but prolonged absence as a migrant, albeit not necessarily the de facto main income earner.

To conflate these three distinct categories into one obfuscates more than it clarifies. Obviously, there is a significant difference in terms of livelihood for a female-headed household, depending on whether or not it includes a temporarily absent migrant who remits money from time to time. As far as household income is concerned, I do not find it reasonable to designate the third category above as a female-headed household, even though the rural-based wife is left in charge of managing that part of the split household.

Basically, there are two distinct types of household models: unitary and collective

(Haddad et al. 1997). Unitary models posit that households act as one single decision-making unit. They assume that there exists a parental, or household, welfare function, and that all assets and resources – capital (including land), labour and information – are pooled for the common good, largely because they are diverse, variable, seasonable and unpredictable, thus ironing out fluctuations. Such models have been variously dubbed 'common preferences models', 'altruism models' or 'benevolent dictator models'. However, there is broad consensus that unitary models do not reflect reality; some claim that they are simply wrong. Nancy Folbre (1988:252) finds it «entirely inconsistent to argue [as many neo-liberal economists do] that individuals who are wholly selfish in the market (where there are no interdependent utilities) are wholly selfless within the family, where they pursue the interest of the collectivity.»

Collective models have been launched as alternatives to the unitary mode of thinking. These models recognise conflicting interests and diverging preferences within the household – between the spouses, parents and children, among siblings in terms both of gender and age, etc. Collective models, in turn, subsume co-operative and non-co-operative variants.

Co-operative approaches assume that the household welfare function reflects a consensus among members, in other words that they agree to follow certain rules of distribution within the household. However, it is rarely specified or investigated how these rules were arrived at and on what normative foundation they rest. Whatever their basis, these rules are rarely so categorical, however, that they leave no room for negotiation. Co-operative household models are plausible because the individuals who form the household do so because they reap some benefits, which would not have been obtainable had they remained alone. The obvious example is the economies of scale associated with the production of certain household goods and the acquisition of certain common (often-intangible) goods – e.g. companionship and security – that by definition would be impossible or difficult to acquire in isolation.

Non-co-operative household models, on the other hand, assume that individual members not only have different preferences but also act as autonomous sub-economies. The household is depicted as a site of largely separate, age- or gender-specific sub-economies, albeit to a certain extent linked by reciprocal claims on the members' income, time, land, goods and labour. There is still a co-operative sphere, but it is marginal relative to what is presumed to exist in co-operative models, e.g. sharing certain functions of a joint dwelling, or certain common meals. In this type of model each individual member has a utility function of goods shared with no one, and an additional common good, the magnitude of which varies as the case may be.

In my judgement the co-operative household model appears to fit the African situation better than the unitary model or the non-co-operative variant of the collective type. While acknowledging the existence of asymmetrical intra-household power relations, it places emphasis on co-operation, which has been the hallmark of African society, even if the collective spirit is not based on equity. One manifestation of household co-operation is a joint decision to split up in order to increase the pool of common resources, for instance through migration of the oscillatory type – shuttling between rural homestead and urban workplace.

If African households, then, are largely translocational or duo-local – dispersed between urban and rural areas – the urban-rural linkages take on particular importance, as do other forms of networks. In spite of geographical separation between household members in rural and urban areas the household could, in a manner of



speaking, be construed as one integrated social field. Intra-household relations would stretch across territories, forming a «seamless fabric made up of the original home, the new home, the people left behind, people encountered in town, as well as all the ramifications of a move upon all parties …» (Nelson 1992:109). The same point is made emphatically by Ross and Weisner (Ross and Weisner 1977:361) in their discussion of rural-urban migration networks in Kenya:

> «This linkage of city and country requires us to conceptualise social and economic life as a common social field in which both rural and urban residents can and do participate, rather than as two discrete social systems with clearly marked borders between them. (…) Most migrants are constrained by social and economic obligations in both city and country; urban employment has important consequences for the quality of rural life, for kinsmen of migrants living on rural farms, and for kin trying to find work in the city».

They go on to specify six preconditions related to this integrated social field: (a) the availability of rural resources to the urban migrant; (b) the control of these resources by patrilineal, patrilocal groups of males to ensure absentee ownership; (c) some family members must reside and work on the farm; (d) the agricultural technology used must be relatively simple; (e) a common kinship, language and cultural unity must exist within a given rural area to enhance urban social support within the migrant population; and (f) the effective distance or travel time and cost from the rural home to the urban target centre must be 'moderate' (Ross and Weisner 1977:362). These preconditions make up the quintessence of the oscillatory labour migration system that predominates in many parts of Africa.

I will not belabour this point any further. I think it has become clear that Africans who migrate to urban areas do not relinquish their rural ties (Tostensen 1991; Bank 1998; de Haan 1999). They 'straddle' the rural-urban divide. The rigid dichotomy between rural and urban is often false, therefore. The policy implications are considerable. I presume that the majority of this audience is somehow involved in housing and shelter provision in cities. So let me give one example from housing. In-migrants to urban areas who settle in slums or unauthorised settlements – and remain there for the greater part of their working lives – are unlikely to invest in urban housing because their rural links are so strong. Instead, they are inclined to invest in a rural house for retirement purposes, if they have the means to invest at all. Housing schemes premised on the assumption that urban residents are genuine urbanites are doomed to fail. Policy-makers who fail to appreciate these persistent urban-rural linkages will continue to design faulty housing policies and schemes.

Conceptualising Poverty

It appears that a broad consensus has emerged within the donor community with regard to the conceptualisation of poverty and the attendant anti-poverty strategies, despite differences of nuance and emphasis. I shall not delve into a thorough discussion of poverty and its measurement. It will suffice to recapitulate some basic dimensions of the concept: deprivation, vulnerability, and powerlessness.

To be poor means being deprived of basic needs such as food, shelter, education and health. Living at the margin also makes the poor particularly vulnerable to adverse shocks, both natural disasters and human-made calamities. A third dimension of being poor is powerlessness; the poor are ill equipped to alter the social relations that made them poor in the first instance. In daily life, the poorest are often excluded from normal participation in the community; they are socially excluded and destitute at worst. On the measurement side, it must be stated that too much attention has been devoted to narrow money-metric indicators of poverty to the exclusion of qualitative assessments (Hanmer et al. 1999).

How poverty is conceptualised bears decisively on the formulation of poverty-reducing strategies. Above all, analyses of causality are critical inputs to policies designed to get the poor out of their predicament. Since it is recognised that poverty is complex and multi-faceted, it follows that the strategies pointing out of poverty must be comprehensive and multi-pronged. At a general level, the World Bank has formulated a three-pronged strategy (World Bank 2000):

- Promoting opportunity
- Facilitating empowerment
- Enhancing security

Promoting opportunity is associated with economic growth and involves creating new jobs, establishing credit facilities, and expanding markets; building physical and social infrastructure in terms of roads, electricity, water supply, sanitation, schools, and health facilities. This is in itself banal and totally unsurprising coming from a banking institution. It is more surprising that the Bank is also concerned with the pattern and quality of economic growth, especially its distributive effects. In fact, the Bank asserts that greater equity is necessary and that action by the state is required to support the build-up of human, land and infrastructure assets that poor people can own or have access to.

Facilitating empowerment implicitly recognises that poverty reflects unequal social and power relations. Powerlessness is the hallmark of poverty. Although pointing to the intrinsically political nature of empowerment, the Bank shies away from its full implication: political struggle. Instead, the Bank speaks of collaboration among poor people, the middle class, and other groups in society. It is not acknowledged that empowerment of the poor must mean the disempowerment of the non-poor – in relative terms – since the power concept is a relational one. Thus, poverty-reduction entails changing social and power relations – often in fundamental ways. Glossing over this fact makes the strategy flawed.

Enhancing security requires national action to mitigate the consequences of adverse shocks on the poor. This can be done through various social security schemes, specific emergency programmes, building up buffer stocks, and diversifying household income sources.

The Bank claims that there is no hierarchy of importance between these three prongs; they are deeply complementary and interdependent. I would say, however, that empowerment takes precedence because it goes to the core of the poverty phenomenon, i.e. unequal power relations at all levels of society.

As always, the proof of the pudding lies in the eating. Although a broad consensus has been arrived at regarding the general precepts of anti-poverty policies, it is acknowledged that there is no ‘quick fix’ to the poverty problem, or a universal blueprint



that will fit all situations. At the national and local levels, each country needs to design its own package of anti-poverty policies, tailored to the circumstances at hand and reflecting national priorities.

In assessing the resultant poverty-reduction strategies it might be useful to apply the hierarchy of interventions suggested by Reginald Green (1994):

- Primary redistribution, i.e. enabling poor households to produce and earn more, in order for them to be able to fend for themselves on a sustainable basis rather than being dependent perpetually on relief and handouts. This is considered the core of an effective poverty-reducing strategy whose ultimate objective is the eradication of poverty altogether, however distant the achievement of that objective may seem;
- Secondary redistribution, i.e. providing basic health services, safe water, nutrition, education and extension services to poor households to raise their present and future productive capacities;
- Tertiary redistribution, i.e. building and reinforcing safety nets of cash or kind (particularly food) transfers to alleviate consumption shortfall due to conjunctural shocks such as droughts, floods or other natural or man-made calamities (e.g. civil strife and war).

In the above schema primary redistribution is akin to the World Bank's notions about opportunities, and especially empowerment. Secondary redistribution, on the other hand, is coupled primarily with opportunities but less with empowerment. Finally, tertiary redistribution is almost synonymous with enhancing security. In the past, the donor community has been criticised for restricting itself to secondary and tertiary redistribution. Since then, there has been a development, however, in the donors' mode of thinking. To include empowerment as a key element in poverty-reduction strategies is a step forward towards addressing primary redistribution. Likewise, the World Bank is talking about «negotiated land reform». And the pendulum seems to have swung from the erstwhile extreme liberalism towards state intervention in selected fields. One might be tempted to ask whether the World Bank has gone social democratic?

Specificities of Urban Poverty

What I have outlined above is the generic concept of poverty at an aggregate level. However, I intend to draw attention to the specific features of urban poverty as distinct from rural poverty or poverty in general.

Drawing on Kamete et al. (2001) it should be stated at the outset that African poverty is fast becoming urbanised. The 'urban bias' thesis has largely been overtaken by events. The perception that urban areas are well off and that all poverty is rural is slowly giving way to a more realistic view that poverty is ubiquitous and increasingly found in urban areas. This realisation has implications for how we analyse the poverty phenomenon and how poverty-reduction strategies are formulated. Most of the general features of poverty outlined above also apply to urban poverty. But there are special characteristics of urban poverty that set it apart and need to be understood better (Wratten 1995; Moser and Holland 1997).

Urban dwellers generally face higher living costs than rural dwellers, because many rural households may draw on subsistence production. Urban areas are characterised by a higher degree of commercialisation of goods, services and land than rural areas. Poor urban households typically spend relatively more on food than do rural households. Similarly, fuel and water figure prominently in the budgets of poor urban households. Firewood and charcoal, which are widely used in poor urban areas without electricity, are expensive to buy and hard to collect. In urban areas where piped or running water is not available, water tends to be a major expense. User fees normally have to be paid for private or communal services. Public or private transportation to and from work in the city often consumes a substantial share of household income.

Housing is normally a considerable one-time construction expense, even for people living in poor-quality dwellings. The urban land and housing markets are often subjected to speculation, rendering dwellings unaffordable for the urban poor. Credit – if available at all to poor people – tends to carry high interest rates. In case of default the dwellers are evicted and the dwelling repossessed. In many cases the prohibitive building costs compel urban dwellers to rent accommodation.

The income of urban households tends to vary considerably, both for individual households over time and between different households. Retrenchment in the public sector due to structural adjustment has affected many badly. Food subsidies have largely disappeared. With the downscaling and redundancy of formal employment, an increasing number of people have resorted to the informal economy, which is by now largely perceived as a «competitive dead-end sector with low pay and long hours» (Moser 1996:24).

Many urban households depend on a sole breadwinner, which makes them vulnerable. With retrenchment, illness, divorce or other conditions taking away the main source of family income, there are generally no systems of social security or other support structures buffering such shocks. In response to decreasing and fluctuating income more household members tend to be forced onto the labour market or into a multitude of pursuits.

Urbanisation has led to significant changes in the social organisation of communities, neighbourhoods, families and households (Hannerz 1980; Tvedten and Pomuti 1994; Rakodi 1997). Nuclear and one-parent households have become more common, at the expense of multi-generational extended family units. While this entails a smaller number of mouths to feed, it also means fewer potential income earners. Economic hardship and congestion of people have also made household units less stable, leading to radical household composition shifts. Divorce rates also tend to be higher in urban than in rural areas. Furthermore, poor urban communities tend to be less cohesive than traditional rural villages because people come from different geographical areas and diverse ethnic backgrounds. The combination of poverty and a heterogeneous population often exacerbate instability and tension. As a result, crime and violence (both public and domestic) tend to be more prevalent in urban than in rural areas.

The relative isolation and individualisation of many urban communities and social units have led to more vulnerable social networks. The ability to overcome an economic crisis often depends on the ability to make claims for help or resources from social relationships with family, friends, neighbours or the state – so-called social capital. Alternative urban networks may be created, but these often depend on the command of economic resources and necessary urban cultural competence (such as literacy) that many households do not possess.

In the absence of adequate housing and physical infrastructure, poor urbanites typically face more serious environmental hazards than do rural dwellers, e.g. air and water pollution.



The central importance of housing to peoples' quality of life is often overlooked (UNCHS 1996). Secure tenure and house ownership are important preconditions for economic security as well as physical well-being. In the absence of adequate housing, and attendant piped water, drains, sewers, regular solid waste collection, etc, poor urban populations are at risk both economically and in terms of environmental hazards (McGranahan and Leitman 1997). The high population densities in most urban shantytowns have made infectious and parasitic diseases particularly widespread. In fact, illness rather than starvation is the principal cause of death in poor urban areas in Africa, partly because poor nutrition makes people more susceptible to disease, especially children.

HIV/AIDS is currently a grave concern in urban as well as rural areas of Africa. There is no conclusive evidence on the prevalence of AIDS in the two types of setting, but over-crowding, poverty and the breakdown of traditional structures of social organisation are likely to add to the impact of the AIDS pandemic in cities and towns.

Overall, the urban poor are characterised by a high degree of vulnerability despite their relatively higher average level of income compared to that of the rural poor. Poor urban households are more exposed to changes in income and prices for basic goods and services, and their vulnerability is exacerbated by poor housing, the deterioration of public services, and increasing tension and violence in congested urban settings. In fact, the degree of poverty in urban households seems to have less to do with the actual amount of material resources accruing to these units than with the way in which such resources are controlled, used and allocated.

Earlier on I drew attention to urban-rural interactions and that many poor urban dwellers maintain close links with their rural areas of origin (Tacoli 1998; de Haan 1999; Jerve 2001). This applies not only to the first generation of migrants, but also to people who have grown up in urban settings.

Such links first of all take the form of exchange of goods and services. Urban households typically send money or commodities to rural relatives or friends, including clothes, detergents, soap, tobacco, sugar, flour, tools, utensils, and imported goods. Rural households for their part may supply their urban relatives with foodstuffs (meat, staple grains and vegetables), home-made beverages, firewood and building material.

In addition to exchanging goods and services, many poor urban households have members staying in rural areas for longer or shorter periods of time. This typically involves children who stay with relatives where food is more easily accessible and life more tranquil; youngsters staying in the rural areas to attend to land and cattle; or older people moving back to their rural area of origin when they are unable to work in town any more. On the other hand, many poor urban households are compelled to host and feed rural relatives and friends who need a place to stay when in town. Visits like these often represent heavy economic burdens on the households concerned, but are difficult to escape because they are considered a reciprocal element of social capital.

The close links between urban and rural areas have a number of important implications. Problems of unemployment and poverty in cities and towns have repercussions in rural areas, and, vice versa, problems of low agricultural production in the countryside impact adversely on urban areas. However, there are indications that the extent of such linkages varies both among urban areas and between households within given shantytowns. The poorest households seem to have the greatest problem in establishing and maintaining such links, which reinforces their marginalisation and exclusion.

What is analytically designated 'urban' and 'rural' cannot be treated as a sharp dichotomy of discrete entities to be approached by completely separate modes of intervention. To consider the 'rural' and the 'urban' as one social field would be analytically more appropriate. There are 'grey' areas in between that can be classified as neither 'urban' nor 'rural'. When considering policy and project interventions the close urban-rural linkages of reality need to be taken into account; it is more important to acknowledge the interdependence of urban and rural areas than to insist on their separateness. Having said this, the analytical distinction between 'urban' and 'rural' is still pertinent because there are – after all – significant differences between 'urban' and 'rural' areas that have a strategic bearing.

Urban Segregation

Poverty is not only pervasive and deep in many countries. It is also an increasingly urban phenomenon. Moreover, poverty is a mechanism of differentiation and segregation – a 'distinction' to used Pierre Bourdieu's term (Bourdieu 1984).

Most towns and cities are segregated by one criterion or another: race, class, income level, nationality, ethnicity, and religion. When the term segregation is mentioned the association it evokes is the egregious form of racial segregation that South Africa's apartheid system epitomised. I will leave it to others to talk more about South Africa later today. But even with apartheid on the garbage heap of history, the historical legacy of racial segregation persists in large parts of contemporary Africa (Freund 1984), particularly in towns and cities designed by colonialists. Initially, residential areas were segregated by race. With decolonisation the racial laws were repealed, however.

In line with the essence of colonial rule – segregation, land alienation and labour migration – fairly strict zoning laws and regulations were enforced. Zoning was partly functional and partly residential. Functionality led to clear distinctions between place of residence and place of work, which deviated from the pattern found in pre-colonial towns. This created a need for a transportation system across the city, because the residential areas were often located at considerable distance from the workplaces. Many workers moved on foot, not because it was their preference but because there was no affordable alternative. The middle classes generally lived closer to business centres and government offices and were more likely to have private means of transport.

Zoning also created clearly demarcated government and administrative areas; commercial or business districts; industrial areas; and to some extent recreational areas (O'Connor 1983).

Segregation does not only mean that people of different categories live in different parts of the cities. It also means that other features of these areas are differentiated. Many cities are characterised by a steep socio-economic gradient from the areas where



the wealthy elite lives via those of the middle classes to the squalid slums of the workers and the destitute. This gradient represents a wide range in living conditions in terms of social services and infrastructure. As far as housing is concerned the density is much lower in the affluent areas – with perhaps 15 people per hectare – than in the poor areas where the density might be ten times higher. Similarly, the distribution and quality of physical and social infrastructure such as roads, water supplies and sanitation, schools and health facilities are highly differentiated. Likewise, the crime rates tend to differ. Although affluent residents are often targets of crime, it is a misconception that the poor are spared of this social ill. Crime and human insecurity are rampant in the unauthorised settlements, where police protection is minimal either because it is non-existent or because the police are corrupt!

Post-colonial governments as part of their physical planning in urban areas have retained many of the erstwhile zoning policies. But the legal restrictions on residence are gone. Still, socio-economic segregation persists. Why? What are the social mechanisms whereby cities remain segregated? I will suggest two: social capital and income level.

In-migrants to the cities seek out their kin with whom they have some affinity either by direct kinship, ethnic affiliation or cultural belonging. The urban newcomers are part of a social network of which the already urbanised also belong. This is their social capital (Portes 1998) or solidarity that they draw upon when entering the city. Initially they stay with kinfolk and gradually they tend to settle near by, thus giving rise to homogeneity of residence – no longer based on race but ethnicity or kinship. Having said this, I would not like to overstate the homogeneity of residential areas. The trend in post-colonial Africa has clearly been towards a hybrid form in terms of race and ethnicity, even religion. Many residential areas are more ethnically mixed these days than they were previously. But in terms of the poverty variable, differentiation has not changed much. Poverty seems a less flexible criterion than ethnicity.

Sometimes segregation criteria operate in conjunction so that, for example, residential patterns based on race are coterminous with class: e.g. the areas inhabited by blacks are also the poorest. In such situations the poverty criterion seems to take precedence over whatever other criterion it is combined with. This brings me to the second social mechanism that contributes to keeping contemporary cities in a segregated state: income level.

The segregated city in terms of amenities, infrastructure and housing also means differentiation in cost of living between various residential areas. It is a truism that it is prohibitively expensive for poor people to settle in low-density, well- serviced areas. Alternatively, they seek residence in affordable areas. For the poorest it means relegation to the slums. The market forces see to that.

What are the policy implications of the segregated city today? They are many and we will no doubt discuss some of them later on today. I will just give some preliminary cues at the general level. First, some sort of legal recognition must be given to the illegal settlements that exist today in order to provide security of tenure for the tenants. Second, the physical and social infrastructure of these high-density residential areas must be improved dramatically to make them liveable. The struggle over the cost of doing so must be fought between governments, residents and donors.

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

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The Compact City Debate and Urban Social Segregation

Rod Burgess (Oxford Brookes University, UK)

One important consequence of the search for sustainable urban development has been a resurgence of interest in compact city theories and policies. The reasons offered for making cities more compact have changed in the 150 years or so since the question was first broached. In the current period the desirability - or in some views the necessity - for compaction is rooted in the sustainability imperatives of resource conservation (particularly fossil-fuelled energy) and waste-minimization (particularly carbon emissions into the global atmospheric sink). The relationship between the built environment and energy use at a global level is now emerging as the principal preoccupation of the urban disciplines of architecture, planning and design. Contemporary compact city policies are advocated as a way of achieving sustainable urban development, but there are major counter arguments on both sustainability and other grounds.

An effective definition of sustainable development should include five elements: resource conservation; waste minimisation; inter-generational equity; social equity and spatial equity. This involves the avoidance of the displacement of externalities on to other generations, social groups or spatial units at all scales from the local to the global. This paper is largely concerned with the social consequences of attempts to make cities more compact: is the environmental rationality underpinning these policies contradicted by their negative effects on social equity - including increased social and spatial segregation?

The paper gives a brief definition of compact city approaches and a short history of their evolution. Some different models for compaction are examined. Arguments for and against compact city approaches are outlined and attention is focused on the social consequences of compaction policies.

Arguments For and Against Compact Cities

Argumets For Compact Cities:



A. Environmental

Climate change is « the most critical challenge facing all professions working on the energy characteristics of urban settlements.»

If the pattern of Developed Country urbanization becomes global and in the absence of technical energy solutions - large scale ecosystem collapse seems likely. Planning and urban form are central to sustainable urban development. Settlement forms should be promoted that have the least need for energy intensive patterns of activity.

There is evidence that changing the shape, size, density, layout and location of activities in cities can bring energy demand variations of up to 150%.

Some studies show that low density cities use twice as much energy as high density cities allowing for climate and income variations. Per capita carbon emissions are higher in low density compared to high density cities eg 20 tonnes p.a. in Canadian cities,10 tonnes per capita p.a. Amsterdam

There is evidence that work distances increase with lower population densities; that smaller urban and rural areas are the most fuel inefficient and that urban size is positively correlated with transport energy consumption. It is claimed that compaction will bring about :

- shorter journeys
- modal shift to more public transport use with major energy savings. In Los Angeles 90 % of commuters drive to work, in Tokyo 15%.
- less pollution
- less carbon loading
- less car dependency
- reduced urban travel demand

Compaction will bring about:

- reduced loss of open land. Egypt has lost over 10% of its productive land over last 30 years, W.Europe loses 2% of its agricultural land a decade
- reduced loss of natural habitats and wild life resources
- preservation of green space
- reclamation of brownfield sites-reclamation of car space(In USA a third of urban land is used to meet needs of the car)

Compaction and sustainable urban development will mean:

- increased energy efficiency in planning and site design, building design, appliances, land use patterns
- there can be increased thermal efficiency and less energy consumption in compact housing forms
- more recycling of waste flows

Compact cities will bring about:

- more healthy forms of transport
- improved quality of life

B. Economic

Higher densities mean:

- lower transport expenditures
- lower pollution costs
- lower heating and lighting costs (energy efficient buildings)
- higher recycling rates of waste through lower collection costs

Higher densities mean:

- cheaper infrastructure and service costs
- more efficient use of existing infrastructure and commercial facilities in inner city areas (dedensification)
- increased economic viability of public transport
- more derelict and contaminated land brought into productive use

Higher densities mean:

- a more rational allocation of domestic space given smaller households
- an increased choice of dwelling types

Higher densities bring about:

- an improved milieu for business, trading and small scale enterprises.
- an increased urban vitality and diversity
- an increase in local accessibility to services

C. Social

Compact cities will mean:

- a form and scale appropriate for social interaction; socialized lifestyles; they will increase the social functions of street life.
- increased urban diversity and vitality. The encouragement of urban revitalization.
- neighbourhoods and communities will develop strong local identity and control (compact neighbourhoods).They can develop their own character, culture and life styles and more social cohesion and community spirit.

Compact cities will mean:

- a more vibrant cultural life, support for local facilities and more autonomy
- an increased range, choice and quality of cultural and recreational facilities and services

Compact cities will allow:

- more natural surveillance of streets
- more defensible open space



Compact cities will result in:

- increased social equity through improved access to services in walking distance.

Compact cities will involve:

- support for a rich architectural inheritance
- less visual monotony
- infill can improve the coherence of the built fabric

Compact cities will mean:

- less fear /anxiety for safety in traffic.
- greater local access to services/schools
- less time wasted in commuting

Arguments Against Compact Cities:

A. Environmental

Compact cities result in:

- more overcrowding
- overstretched services
- less open space
- more congestion
- more air ,water, soil and noise pollution
- more traffic, fire, health and safety hazards

Given the scale of the demand for urban land, goods and services further development on greenfield sites is essential. A small increase in travel time and distances can increase x4 the space available.

Compact cities can:

- reduce open and green space
- reduce urban agriculture and private green space, Currently 14 of China's 15 largest cities are virtually self-sufficient in food.
- reduce inner city wildlife habitats on derelict land

Compact cities will mean:

- journeys to work but an increase in recreational travel
- an increase in the demand for water supply and drainage. Problems associated with the increase in 'hard surfaces' that boost urban runoff of water and pollutants;
- lessened opportunities to collect and use rainwater

B. Economic

The compaction of cities is an expensive and ineffective solution to the problem of global warming:

- there is evidence that the energy gains from modal shift in transport are marginal (eg. only 10% of Australian energy use is in fuel. Probable gains about 2.5%)
- density is not the principal determinant of travel behaviour but household income and gasoline price are.
- greater sustainability gains are possible from lower densities, increased self-sufficiency, changes in travel behaviour, more environmentally friendly technologies, decentralized lifestyles (electronic cottage model). Teleworking and commuting will unglue cities. Cities are inherently unsustainable.

Compact cities are unsuccessful, undesirable and unworkable because of :

- current economic trends
- quality of life aspirations

Compaction policies conflict with:

- the logic of property markets and will increase land and property values
- brownfield site development requires heavy subsidies and relative costs of brownfield versus greenfield site development need to be considered.

Compact city advocacy ignores:

- the causes and effects of decentralization and the benefits it might bring. How do you convince people to live together more closely in a period of rapid space/time compression, increased mobility and the globalization of urban systems?
- the income command of space effect
- the effect of telecomunications developments in weakening agglomeration economies
- the quality of life aspirations of business elites and substantial sections of the population

C. Social

Compaction is not feasible because it is:

- not what the majority of the population wants. It is politically unacceptable and does not reflect social expectations
- it reduces the quality of life
- it leads to lower levels of privacy
- people want more private and public space not increased densities
- the suburbs may be ‘subtopia’ but subtopia is popular
- people will not give up their cars : for convenience and status symbol

Compaction will lead to greater social and spatial inequality:

- it is a ‘gentrifiers charter’. The rich will hang on to their space but the poor will loose it.
- the poor will be expelled by increased land and property prices. It is a force for social exclusion

- there will be an increase in social and spatial inequality



Compact cities could intensify problems of social disintegration:

- Social cohesion is weakening in the face of massive individualism. Bad neighbour effect is highly likely.
- Could lead to an increase in crime and violence with higher densities. Densification could produce more anonymity and alienation.

European perspective

Terje Wessel (University of Oslo, Norway)

The speech will focus on the significance of segregation in European cities. In the introduction, I will present a short explanation of the term «segregation», followed by a summary of segregation trends in Europe.

Increasing segregation, either in socio-economic or ethnic terms, is obviously a major anxiety in urban politics. This subjective-matter derives its importance from suspected reinforcement effects, that is, the belief that individuals will have their life-chances affected, for better or for worse, by living in particular social environments. Put briefly, the question is: Do poor neighbourhoods make their inhabitants poorer? And subsequently: Is it possible to improve the life-chances of deprived individuals by promoting social or ethnic mixture?

American research on this issue is substantive, which have led to similar suggestions in the European context. European research, however, has for long been rather superficial and unsystematic. This is now changing, and interesting results are appearing from a number of cities. Although these results do not specify the pathways whereby segregation is a vicious circle, they do contain political implications.

Generally, the new research indicates that neighbourhood effects do exist, although they are both modest and dependent on the choice between descriptive («objective») and evaluative («subjective») indicators. Moreover, there seems to be a tendency towards linear effects, indicating that segregation might be a vicious circle at lower levels than usually presumed. By contrast, most segregation policies throughout Europe are based on non-linear effects, that is, effects with worse outcomes in the poorest areas.

So far, we do not have sufficient knowledge as to how Norwegian cities fit into this general picture. If corroborated in the Norwegian context, such associations would seem to legitimate criteria based policies more than policies targeted at specific areas (e.g. the Oslo inner east programme).

Religion and culture: The origin and dynamics of divided space and people. The case of Ahmedabad, Gujarat

Aparajita De (University of Gujarat, India)

At the turn of this Century mankind made incalculable leaps in the technological arena. Technological development was predicted to have closed the gap between people and places particularly with the invention of the aircraft, wireless communication and more recently the Internet. Consequently, time-space convergence occurred leading to a shrinking world that was linked with forms of universalistic human communities or 'Brotherhoods' and a "world without borders". On the other hand, the world witnessed a growing emphasis on differences, distinctiveness, separateness and ultimately exclusiveness which manifested in the form of violent riots, pogroms, conflicts, civil wars and separatist-nationalist movements. Calls to return to one's roots have reverberated around the world resulting in some of the worst ever genocide and mass killings.

The processes of globalization have in effect given rise to two main paradoxical situations: the formation of geographical islands or segregated space, the revival of primordial/historical/ascriptive socio-cultural identities and the articulation of these identities through space. This paper attempts to look into these issues through the case study of Ahmedabad.

Segregated Space: An Act of Resistance?

Globalization and modernity in the everyday life-world of people have become coterminous with rapid and complete mutability and resultant loss of control. Consequently, at the personal and group level people perceive the situation as an anomie, threatening one's familiar and stable world. What have emerged are localized societies as an act of resistance to globalizing society. Control over space and articulation of power through segregated space can be interpreted as a direct outcome of people's effort to homogenize, hegemonize and counter relativisation of particular identities in order to colonize the future and gain control over systematic power.

Segregation is a process by which spatial domains are created. It is also an act of confinement of others or confining oneself to a specific area by particular groups of people. It thereby defines and delimits a particular area to be solely used by that group. Segregation achieves firstly, an allusion to ownership or feelings of proprietorship; secondly, complete domination or control over space and lastly, define the group's sphere of action where it is supreme. It is thus a process closely associated with the personalization of geographical area or space representing and symbolic of what a group stands for, its values and belief, attitude and life-style. Segregated space is thus a "value endowed place" analogous with the experience of stability, security, power, predictability and continuity. It also becomes a principle of organization differentiating "self" and "others" and the reaffirming one's sense of self identity. Segregation also results in the polarization of communities over space consequently enhancing social mobilization, local autonomy and citizen participation through the democratic processes of elections.



Segregation thus produces two contrary forces simultaneously: a centrifugal force that fragments and disperses society at the macrocosmic level and a centripetal force that unites society at the microcosmic level. It is pervaded by externalities both positive and negative. On one hand, it creates co-operation, understanding, reliability, trust and reciprocity amongst in-group members. On the other, it produces abundant negative externalities like suspicion hostility and outright hatred towards out-group members. Often these negative externalities generate social tensions and unrest leading to acts of violence, riots and conflicts.

Recasting of Socio-Cultural Identities

Conception of self identity is embedded in the dualistic construct of "self" and "others" and with changing situations these perceptions are reinvented, redefined and modified in order to adapt to particular needs of the people. Hence, the emergence of a specific identity is closely associated with one's survival strategy - real or imagined. Groups on the basis of shared identity form interest/pressure groups, including few and excluding others. Such closed groups lead to exclusionary measures: denying "others" access to resources, opportunities and information and maximizing and confining economic rewards and benefits to an "eligible" few. It is a complementary rather than a competitive modus operandi (at the intra-community level) whereby resources of many are pooled for mutual benefit – the outcome being reciprocal economic behaviour giving birth to a kind of egalitarian society. This makes possible the social creation, allocation and redistribution of scarce resources through collective consumption of goods and services, control and centralization of a large number of decentralized decisions.

Social identity, when fused with cultural markers cuts across class barriers and interests establishing a new communitarian feeling. This lays the foundation of a social, political and economic entity becoming a viable instrument for organization and mobilization of individuals and groups creating internal voluntaristic participation, responsiveness and equality that are in keeping with democratic and egalitarian values. Thus we have a culturally produced civil society which becomes the vanguard of political and social freedom as repression against it becomes difficult. Such socio-cultural identity based secular interest/pressure groups do have the potential to provide economic, social and political protectionism.

Restricted sociability (that is, the unwillingness of individuals and groups to interact with particular individuals and groups) further optimizes social and economic resources and sets into motion processes of alienation both social and economic. It is essential to discern the two distinct processes of alienation – that of making the other alien and becoming alien. In the case of the former it is dominantly "other-directed" (an external force) and dominantly "self imposed" (an internal force) in the latter. Often, the upper echelons or the elite alienate and isolate themselves in order to maintain their hegemony over the rest of the society and confining all economic and social benefits to themselves. On the other hand, the suppressed in a similar fashion could unite to form a putatively just society in a broader unjust society. Thus, interests (economic, social and political) of various social groups may be at variance with one another producing friction and stress and ultimately conflict between them.

Segregation and Segregating Forces: The Case of Ahmedabad

The city of Ahmedabad is nearly 600 years old, set up by Ahmed Shah in 1411 A.D. on the banks of River Sabarmati. The original city was a walled having twelve gates. The focus of this paper is the walled city of Ahmedabad. It is almost entirely a residential area with traditional neighbourhoods called “pols”. “Pols” are socio-spatial units with low rise compact residential houses enclosed within a wall. People have for generations lived in these “pols” in a segregated manner according to religion, language and caste. There are nearly 900 “pols” in the walled city with mainly Hindus, Muslims, Jains or mixed communities (the “pols” are also segregated along narrower lines of various sub-sects within the larger religious community)

This distribution of communities in the walled city (Table No.1) clearly illustrates high degree of residential segregation. It also clearly depicts the inter-community relations particularly that between the Hindus and Muslims as areas having very high/high concentration of Hindus correspond with areas having low/very low concentration of Muslims and vice-versa.

DISTRIBUTION OF COMMUNITITES BY WARDS IN THE WALLED CITY OF AHMEDABAD

LEVELS OF CONCENTRATION (by weightage)					
COMMUNITIES	VERY HIGH	HIGH	MODERATE	LOW	VERY LOW
HINDU	Khadia I, III Shahpur II Dariapur II	Shahpur I	Khadia II Jamalpur II Kalupur I, II Dariapur I	Kalupur III Raikhad	Jamalpur I
MUSLIM	Jamalpur I	Shahpur II Raikhad Dariapur I Kalupur II	Shahpur I Kalupur I, III	Jamalpur II Dariapur II	Khadia I, II, III
JAIN	Jamalpur II	Khadia III Shahpur II	Kalupur II	Shahpur I Dariapur II KalupurI, III Khadia III Khadia II	Dariapur I Jamalpur I Raikhad

Source: Field work conducted by the author, 2001

Repeated communal clashes and reasons of neither security nor safety can alone explain such segregation. Preferential housing markets and positive externalities of living with the community like easier access to information and opportunity regarding employment, capital (especially soft loans to in-group members), community schools, colleges and hospitals. The community is even the source of spouses, intimate friends; it resolves interpersonal problems between families and within families. An almost parallel welfare state is run at the community level.

The emergence of “Hindu Nationalism” in India which is a kind of self-assertion and reinforcement of the Hindu identity and an articulation of their political and material interests has been one of the major segregating forces in Ahmedabad (particularly in post Godhra Ahmedabad). Politicization of socio-cultural identities also made the minor differences between social groups, real or fabricated more visible. This further added to the segregating and differentiating forces.

As seen from the recent communal-religious riots in March 2002, Ahmedabad became the fertile experimental grounds for Hindu Nationalistic elements as it was already deeply segregated and it had already reaped the fruits of close community bonds and ties chiefly due to which it is one of the most progressive states of India.



Conclusion

Technological advancement may have created a different world of inter-personal and inter community communication but it still fails to explain the needs of social organization. Human environment with social, economic and psychological interdependencies have given a new look to the traditional areal and social differentiation in a post-modern, complex cultural landscape of human segregations giving rise to geographies of justice and injustice; of hegemony and subjugation; of conflict and harmony.

Segregated Cities: Segregation by Colour, Case of the City of Johannesburg, South Africa

Lusanda Mbeje (Cope Housing Association, Johannesburg, South Africa)

Introduction

South Africa was a very torn and racially fragmented country before 1994. Its cities became notorious for their exclusion of the majority of the population from economic opportunities and social services. Racist policies and laws were the order of the day with no regard for human justice. This presentation will therefore look at segregation in Johannesburg in an attempt to investigate the current urban realities in the city and provide an outline for critical thinking around the further development of Johannesburg.

Background to Segregation by Colour in Johannesburg before 1994

Johannesburg was established in 1886 as a mining town following the discovery of gold. Due to this discovery the population of Johannesburg grew rapidly and more than doubled by 1890 constraining limited infrastructure such as housing and water services. Settlements were as a result not properly planned and people sprawled haphazardly around mining areas. According to Frescura and Radford (1982) «the original miner's camp had been located at the Fordsburg dip, possibly through the availability of water there as well as the site's close locality to the diggings» (2). By 1890 the fledging suburbs of Doornfontein and Jeppestown to the east, Booysens to the south and Ferreira and Fordsburg to the west, were being developed. As the town grew in size, more suburbs were built such as Faraday and Sophiatown where Blacks, Indians and Coloureds mixed and there were some Indians and Coloureds who lived in backyards in suburbs such as Doornfontein. The suburb of Bertrams on the eastern side of the city became a home for middle class Whites, while Doornfontein housed the more affluent Whites. « By the early 1890's the rich had found a better location on the north-facing Witwatersrand Ridge, in what became known as Parktown» (Beavon Keith, 2000: 2).

The main structural characteristic of Johannesburg in the period between 1886 and 1900 was that it was a town divided into richer and poorer areas and Whites were mostly the richer race. Blacks, Coloureds and Indians mixed in poorer areas, however, in 1928 the Johannesburg Town Council set up a committee aimed at dealing with settlement issues of natives. The committee essentially looked at removing natives from squatter settlements which they had illegally occupied. At the same time it categorized settlements of non-whites according to race. The township of Orlando was then established in 1931, 15 kilometres to the southwestern part of Johannesburg, to house the rapidly growing black population, marking the start of Soweto. Housing specifically for Coloureds was officially provided in 1937 in a township of Coronationville west of Johannesburg. Sophiatown survived as an area for mixed races until the end of 1950 when it was rezoned, bulldozed and redeveloped as the white residential suburb of Triomf (meaning triumph) under the Group Areas Act. In 1955 a township of Lenasia to the south of central Johannesburg was established specifically for Indians. These structural and land usage approaches mirrored the political and economic realities facing the country. In fact, the two mutually enforced de facto and later legislative apartheid policies of South Africa.

The country actually experienced massive political transformation in the period between 1910 and 1930, in an overall process of developing a racialised capitalist modernity. This development affected planning approaches, and a British colonial planning ideology took root. The result of that was the formulation of land administration mechanisms such as town planning schemes which had a tendency of shaping human settlement patterns along racial and class lines. The 1913 Land Act is one example of such legislations whose main intent was to divide South Africa into arable and non-arable land, with the Blacks restricted mainly to non-arable portions constituting a mere 13% of the national land area. The 1930's saw the consolidation of the control-oriented and fragmented approaches to planning evidenced by the 1934 Slums Act which resulted in the eviction of non-whites from well-serviced areas to poor locations, thus setting the basis for apartheid planning.

The election of the National Party into power in 1948 led to the implementation of grand apartheid policies that reinforced already existing segregationist policies. Hendrickse (1998) states «the rapid implementation of apartheid was only possible because it was an extension of long-standing, deep-rooted segregation which had divided the population on racial lines» (Hendrickse, 1998: 1). Under the National Party government pass laws and influx control acts became stricter as a way of controlling Blacks from migrating to urban areas. The Group Areas Act of 1950 enforced the notion of separate development by legally prescribing where different population groups could own property, reside and work. In the early 1960"s the government of the day used separate development policies to create nine Bantustans ("native homelands") out of the 13% of the national land area that was reserved for Black occupation and ownership as a further attempt of keeping Blacks away from urban areas. Industrial decentralisation policies were also used to further perpetuate separate development by creating industries on the borders of homelands (Bantustans).

The majority of the population in Johannesburg was in essence located mainly on the southwestern parts of the city in areas that are at a distinct disadvantage in comparison to the areas occupied by whites on the northern parts of the city. Areas to the south



were generally not desirable for residential purposes by the majority of the city's inhabitants due to their lack of proper services and susceptibility to harsh weather conditions. There were also other blacks who housed themselves illegally in a township of Alexandra north of the city center, however the authorities at the time did not do much to remove them from this location since it was in close and dangerous proximity to the main sewerage system of the city as a whole which ran through Juskei River. Conditions of black inhabitants in the city of Johannesburg became even worse after the election of the National Party into power in 1948, particularly under the Group Areas Act of 1950 and 1966.

The legacy of urban planning under apartheid in Johannesburg is in simple terms a disaster. Planning was used as an instrument of coercion and crude social engineering and this is still evident in present day Johannesburg. Turok states that «the state's hostility to black urbanization deprived the townships of essential services, housing and economic opportunities, and the fragmented, racially based local government system proved structurally flawed and incompetent to cope with the wide-ranging crisis created» (Turok, 1993: 1). A top-down planning approach was adopted which involved the exclusion of the intended beneficiaries from the plans. A range of disparities was therefore created resulting in the exacerbation of economic conditions for blacks and other non-white race groups who basically had to travel long distances from their townships to places of work. Health and educational services were also of poor standard compared to services provided to whites.

The overall idea of apartheid planning was to create self-contained localities that were racially distinct and financially independent with separate public amenities, administrations and infrastructures. Planners were required to demarcate and enforce crude racial zoning patterns within cities which tended to marginalize the majority of the city's population to peripheral areas. Buffer strips of industry or transport infrastructure were used to separate neighbourhoods so as to minimize contact between races.

The imposition of apartheid policies dislocated established communities and entrenched social inequalities in the built environment particularly in urban areas. The profession of planning was at this period highly influenced by political ideology in that failing to address environmental and people-centered planning ethics. «Apartheid fundamentally damaged the spatial, social and economic environments in which people live, work, raise families and seek to fulfill their aspirations» (White Paper on Local Government, 1998: 9). The legacy of apartheid planning is still very evident in Johannesburg today since large numbers of blacks still live in poverty-stricken areas far from work opportunities.

Implications of Racial Segregation in the City of Johannesburg

The legacy of apartheid planning has had major implications on the city of Johannesburg: economic costs, public sector inefficiencies and social inequalities. Firstly the fragmented nature of Johannesburg has undermined economic and employment growth by creating barriers to trade, commuting and other economic interactions normally found in cities by housing the majority of the population approximately 20 kilometres from centres of economic opportunity. Public transport systems are not very reliable and also costly impacting negatively on families living on the periphery. Spatial fragmentation has also increased the cost of public services unnecessarily since the provision of such services to low-density and remote locations imposes high costs to the public sector. For example townships of Soweto are at least 20 kilometers away form the city which means providing services there becomes expensive. The spatial separation of races has also widened social inequalities due to substandard education, inadequate health care and societal infrastructure experienced by the majority. These tend to negatively impact on family life and promulgate socio-economic divisions between races in South Africa.

Economic or Racial Segregation? South Africa After 1994

Signs of crumbling of the apartheid system started revealing themselves in the early 1990's as the African National Congress (ANC) fought harder against the system in support of a non-racial democracy. A government of national unity was gradually born between 1991 and 1994 following the release of Nelson Mandela from prison in 1990 after 27 years. The first democratic elections in South African history took place in 1994 followed by local authority elections in 1995. The main goal of the new government was to reconstruct and integrate South Africa by providing adequate housing, alleviate poverty, redistribute land to previously disadvantaged communities and contribute towards environmentally sustainable development through Reconstruction and Development Programmes (RDP) of 1994 to 1996.

Tomlinson states, «The government's aim to build compact and integrated cities is intended to remedy the disadvantages and neglect characteristics of the apartheid city, and ensure that the basic needs of all South Africans are provided for. Under the mantle of the Reconstruction and Development Programme, the government provides housing subsidies and grants for investment in municipal infrastructure. In calling for compact and integrated cities, the government is working towards desegregation and high density, mixed-use development. It is anticipated that the mix of residential, economic and social activities will enhance access to jobs and social services and reduce the cost of transport and installation of municipal services» (Tomlinson in Mail and Guardian, 05 May 2000: 32). The RDP was however viewed as too humanitarian because it neglected economic growth resulting to its replacement by the Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy in 1996, which was also critiqued for being capitalist.

The Development Facilitation Act (DFA) no. 67 of 1995 was passed to provide the basis for a coherent framework for land development according to a set of binding principles. The principles involved the requirement to develop land in a more integrated and holistic approach by simultaneously addressing social, economic and environmental issues. The idea was to create desegregated, high-density mixed-use developments to be facilitated through Integrated Development Plans. Land Development Objectives were subsequently developed under the DFA to deal with issues of spatial development for specific locations to enable a more focused tailor-made approach to area development. There have been a couple of improvements in terms of creating compact and more integrated cities since 1994. First and foremost previously disadvantaged groups are now able to live in areas previously meant for Whites.

t is important to note that in the early 1990s big business started moving out of central business districts in big cities such as Johannesburg due to crime and grime and also



racism because blacks were now able to move into such areas. The moving away of big businesses resulted to the decay of the city, however, these trends are beginning to change as small-medium entrepreneurs are slowly occupying the city and rejuvenating it. Economic segregation is uppermost today in cities but the majority of those with economic advantages are white, which basically suggests a silent form of 'neo-apartheid». As Keith Beavon argues, «Gaining access to residential property in the northern suburbs of Johannesburg is determined by price. However in reality price alone creates a form of de facto apartheid» (Beavon, 2000: 2).

It is of course true that South Africa is currently working towards creating desegregated cities for a variety of reasons but there is some criticism. A few Property Consultants have argued that, «the residential location of Blacks in previously White, Coloured or Indian neighbourhoods has been linked to the devaluation of such areas resulting to the moving out of the former race groups from such areas». Blacks today occupy the suburbs of Randburg and Windsor, north of Johannesburg central, previously meant for White occupation. The current crime and grime in these suburbs has been associated with the moving in of blacks, as such, property values in Windsor and Randburg are viewed as much lower.

There are of course those who argue that Johannesburg has become a city on the brink of a nervous breakdown due to the inability of the «previously secure White minority» to control the movements of the majority who they associate with crime and violence. The result of this has been «the growing omnipresence of walled compounds and closed off streets with 24 hour armed guards, live electric fencing and menacing razor wire to keep «them» (blacks) out» (Mail and Guardian, 1998: 1). Hilton Judin (1999) states, «Division and fortification remains the defining legacy of architecture in South Africa. Fortification is at the heart of control and fear. It is about feeling surrounded and entrapped. You see it in buildings, shopping malls and housing complexes». The University of the Witwatersrand is a good example of this, located at the center of Braamfontein, it used to be an institution accessible to the public but today it is surrounded by large fences that require access cards before one can experience its historic beauty.

It is however fair to note that great strides have been taken by the public sector and some private organizations in ensuring that post-apartheid South Africa addresses the needs of all its inhabitants. Access to major urban areas is no longer restricted because all people are free to live in any area provided they can afford it. Affordability has become the major reason behind the separation of communities, and unfortunately the legacy of apartheid in so far as economic inequalities are concerned will take some time before it is completely erased because Whites remain the richer race with the opposite being true for Blacks. However, the poor are now able to live in city centres closer to all amenities, social infrastructure, quality education and public transport routes through efforts of social housing organizations and other affordable housing options in the major cities. It is critical to note that efforts continue to be made to create more compact and integrated cities with acceptable degrees of success even though there are sceptics.

It is also important to note that, although the historical background to the current economic segregation in Johannesburg is perhaps unique and incomparably reprehensible, economic segregation is in fact an international phenomenon from Detroit to Mexico City to London and even Oslo. It is therefore an international challenge to address this economic apartheid in new and innovative ways only then will we ensure the long term stability, safety, growth and community we envision as our urban centers of the future.

The Segregated City – Oslo, Inner East. Living Condition Perspectives

Anders Barstad (The Central Bureau of Statistics, Oslo, Norway)

The city of Oslo is divided into 25 districts, each with its own administration and district council. The inner city east consists of three districts, with a total population of around 80 000. The east-west divide in Oslo has long historical traditions; already around 1875 we can see a clear east-west pattern in the city. Living conditions and segregation in the inner east are influenced by changing labour market and housing market conditions, by a growing economic inequality in the city and by political efforts to improve living conditions in the area. The most decisive factor influencing living conditions is probably the labour market. A sharp decline in the unemployment rate after 1993 has been followed by an increase since 2001. Several groups located in the inner east districts are probably particularly vulnerable to increasing unemployment levels in the economy, i.e. persons with low education, young people in general and immigrants from non-western countries. In the housing market there has been a tremendous increase in housing prices and rents in the latter part of the nineties, even more so in the inner east. In this area there is a large renting sector, around 45 percent of households are tenants. Increasing rents are unfortunate from a social perspective; persons with persistent income problems are mainly tenants. There has been an increase in economic inequality, in Norway as in many other countries. Economic inequalities have grown sharper in Oslo than elsewhere in Norway. «All else equal», we would expect growing inequality to lead to more segregation. From 1997, a program of development for Oslo's east-central districts was implemented. One of the central goals of the program was to improve living conditions and residential environments, with a particular focus on families in the area. There is also a clear goal of creating a more mixed, more varied population composition in the area. One subgoal is to make it easier for families with children to stay. The program is a joint effort from the State government, the Parliament and the Oslo City Government. It was initiated in 1997, with the joint political intention that 100 million Norwegian kroner be invested each year for a period of ten years.

So then, on the background of all this, how are living conditions and segregation levels in Oslo today, particularly in the inner east district? What are the main developments during the last decade? In the city as a whole there is a tendency towards a growing degree of spatial segregation between non-Western immigrants and persons without immigrant background, as shown by sociologist Svein Blom in Statistics Norway. However, after 1998 there has been a stagnating growth of non-Western immigrants in the inner city east, possibly due to gentrification processes and rising housing prices. The Oslo inner east districts have a particular demographic structure, and there are



few signs indicating that this structure has become more varied in the last 5-10 years. Young, single persons in their twenties and thirties are concentrated in the inner east. From 1992 to 2001 the percentage of people belonging to the age group 20-29 increased in two of three inner east districts, contrasting with most other districts in Oslo. There is little evidence that the goal of making families with children stay longer in the area has been realized. Socioeconomic segregation in the city at large has been fairly stable, but there has been a sizeable increase in the percentage of persons with higher education in the inner east. At the same time, there has been an increasing overrepresentation of persons with low education in the eastern suburban districts of Oslo.

In 2001 the unemployment rate and particularly the number of recipients of social assistance were higher in the inner east districts than in Oslo and the country at large. However, both the unemployment rate and the social assistance rate were much higher in the first half of the nineties (rising unemployment levels since 2001 may change this). The number of substandard dwellings in these areas is still relatively high, but has gradually been reduced. Dust and noise from road traffic remains a significant problem affecting many people, but fewer inhabitants in the area seem to be exposed to such problems today than in the eighties. The most dramatic, negative manifestation of living conditions in the inner east concerns health and mortality. The mortality of inhabitants in the inner east districts is 50 percent above the Norwegian average, which means that there is a great potential for saving lives if adequate preventive measures could be found. In this case there has been no signs of decreasing differences. Violence and other forms of criminal behavior is also a particular problem in the area; there are more people worrying about becoming a victim of violence in the inner east than in other parts of Oslo. Maybe the greatest change among inhabitants in the inner east is a greater sense of pride in living in the area. There is considerably less stigmatization of the area in the media and in public discussions. Living in this area of the city has become cool and trendy, the number of bars and restaurants is soaring.

In this situation, the question posed by many is: What happens with those that have bad living conditions in the inner east district? Are they forced to move to other parts of the city, for example to surburban districts in the outer east where prices are relatively low? Or are they forced to move out of the city? There is every reason to follow developments closely in the suburban districts of the east. There are at present no dramatic changes taking place, the most pronounced change is the increasing proportion of non-western immigrants in these parts of Oslo. We plan a project in Statistics Norway to follow the mobility patterns of some groups with low education and income in Oslo, to see if the mobility patterns have changed in the later years.

Closing remarks: Challenges and ways Forward

Anne Ruden (The State Norwegian Housing Bank)

In my concluding remarks, I would like to comment on the practical sides of urbanization and their impacts on the environment and on possibilities for poverty alleviation. Today we have not been talking so much about city to city cooperation and globalisation. But the everlasting questions of resources can not be evaded. The political adviser stressed the international contribution to alleviate the conditions of the poor. If we can learn from history, maybe we can avoid some mistakes. How can we utilize others' experiences? Largely they are not directly applicable. The linkage between the urban and the rural worlds can not be ignored. We need to clarify the terms we use. The objectives are not always clear.

On the analysis of urban growth, Mariken Vaa gave an interesting contribution telling of a declining growth of megacities, contrary to previous forecasts. - Illegal settlements play a very substantial part. We got an interesting summary of failures internationally. It is unlikely that foreign aid will contribute substantially. However, even in slum areas there is a will to invest, but we are not very good at organizing for that. We must focus on capacity building and good governance. To quote Mr. Albert Einstein: *'No problem can be solved from the context that created it'.*

Arne Tostensen made a useful clarification of what is a household, in a complex situation. Using the term we need knowledge about the society in question, its history and the context of households and of present processes going on. Of actions on contextual effects a lot can be done. And, segregation is more than ethnic and racial. – To-day bulldozing is not so frequent, but other means are used which are as structurally violent. In Europe we see new trends; stigmatisation. Nothing to be proud of, but there are no easy solutions.

I attended a conference in Glasgow some time ago, on the revitalisation of a run down neighbourhood. A consequent bottom-up approach was used successfully, with the involvement of everyone concerned. New optimism emerged. – I am happy about what Burgess said about the compact city; environment is task number one, also emphasized in the Habitat context.

Lastly, I would like to mention the Sustainable Building conference in Oslo recently, with an overall message of openness. Self interest will prevail, and we have a lot to do in developing measures. Mark Twain said: *There is not more land, but they are making more food.* - The Nairobi case of a service centre transformed into a program, is interesting.

This year 500 nominees were selected by the UNCHS (Habitat) for a Best practices' award in improving the living environment. – I take the opportunity to challenge the Habitat Norway Association to organize a national competition for the next price in 2004. This would be in line with the political adviser's point; from being largely a domestic issue, housing and human settlements are now part of international cooperation and a growing awareness of housing as an integral part of basic human needs. The UN millennium Declaration adopted a special Habitat declaration with some important milestones:

Urban development - urban crisis:

Urban growth in Sub-Saharan Africa is 7% per annum, compared to the world average of 1-2 %. Urban population expected to grow from 2,5 bn in 1995 to 5 bn in 2025. All population growth takes place in developing countries. Immigration takes over as the main source of urban areas growth. However, as mentioned; urban growth turns out not as fast as predicted. Some declining industrial cities have coped well. On the multiple problems, others have coped poorly; particularly affecting people in poor urban areas.

Shelter crisis:



Illegal settlements go up to 70% in some cities. Regulations are not adopted to the present situation and growth.

Limits of development aid:

There was a shift from governments' attitudes in Habitat I in Vancouver (1996) to Habitat II, Istanbul (1996): From direct government responsibility for shelter, the 1996 Global Plan of Action set up two main aims: 'adequate shelter for all' & 'sustainable human settlements through strategies of enablement/empowerment and good governance'; I e assisted self help.

Is this adequate? Upgrading of illegal settlements must be seen as discrete programs – outside general programs and budgets, however integrated in the governmental processes. Coordination between donors and between recipients is a condition for success. Non-delivery causes breakdown in cooperation with the target group and support. Global report on human settlements 2001 is an ugent challenge for action, emphasising 'from below' approaches. In spite of vast poverty there are unrealised human capital. It is, however, unlikely that foreign aid will play a substantial role in the development of cities.

Conclusion

We should revise some of our notions of trends. There are nuances and new trends to be aware of. Apart from that: processes are dynamic and mechanisms complex. Simple explanations and advice on what to do, do not exist!

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

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